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A B S T R A C T
As the so-called ‘Asian Century’ unfolds, Central Asian countries are increasingly directing
their foreign relations eastward. Meanwhile, Asian states are equally turning to Central Asia
in their search for energy resources and new markets. This dual dynamic is giving rise to
closer and deeper ties in three key areas. As far as infrastructures are concerned, various
Asian powers have adopted Silk Road policies that see Central Asia as a fundamental transit
route for their long-haul connectivity projects. In the ﬁeld of trade, Central Asia’s ex-
changes with other Asian countries have been growing steadily since the 1990s, in some
cases even coming to rival, in comparative terms, exchanges with the West. Lastly, in terms
of multilateralism, Central Asia is increasingly enmeshed in a web of overlapping institu-
tionswith a strong Asian identity, coexistingwith the region’sWestern institutional references.
The article then problematizes this emerging pattern by sketching out some of the possi-
ble ramiﬁcations that could stem from the sustainment and consolidation of these trends
for the international order and the global balance of power.
Copyright © 2015 Production and hosting by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of Asia-Paciﬁc
Research Center, Hanyang University.
Prevailing narratives of Central Asian international pol-
itics typically refer to a looming power struggle along an
East–West divide. Today, however, we also see accelerating
trans-regional ties linking it to diverse Asian sub-regions
(East, West, North, South, and Central), much of them by-
passing theWest altogether. Countries in these sub-regions
are gradually taking an increasingly large place in the foreign
relations of Central Asian states, across a variety of sectors.
In a way, this is a sign of the times: if we speak of an Asian
century today, it is because of the demographic weight and
economic dynamism of this part of the world. With Asia
emerging as an important pole of global economic and po-
litical power,1 it is inevitable for it to gradually drawcountries
from adjacent (sub)regions as it consolidates this role. At
the same time, a number of pull factors are present. Just like
for countries in the West, Central Asia’s natural resources
are an attractive bounty for countries in the East, equally
hungry for energy resources.Moreover, for the rising powers
andemergingeconomiesof East, SouthandWestAsia, Central
Asia represents an obvious hinterland to engage, as they seek
to refashion the environment around them or reach out to
newmarkets. India (DasGupta, 2010; Kavalski, 2009;Moore,
2007; Peyrouse, 2010; Sachdeva, 2006), Iran (Pahlavi&Hojati,
2009), Japan (Dadabaev, 2013, 2014;Hickok, 2000;Rakhimov,
2014), and South Korea (Fumagalli, 2006, 2012) have all dis-
played similar efforts in this direction, though it is China
that has undoubtedly developed the largest footprint, factor
that some regard as the main spur for other major Asian
players like Japan (Walton, 2009) and India (Kavalski, 2010a,
2010b). More recently, ASEAN countries have also begun to
explore ways to connect South-East Asia to Central Asia in
a single economic corridor (Jakarta Globe, 2013).
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On the other hand, Central Asian states have devel-
oped a tradition of foreign and security policy diversiﬁcation
(Contessi, 2015). At a time when Russia, under strain in
the Post-Soviet space, has been tightening its grip on its
“near abroad”, Asian countries represent a further and
previously under-explored vector to mitigate these new
pressures. Meanwhile, this vector can also represent a
way to offset the negative externalities that the economic
crisis in Russia has inevitably generated for the region.
Signiﬁcantly, the search for these connections has ticked
up since 2014. Engaging their broader continent has thus
come to represent an opportunity for Central Asian coun-
tries, and one that comes with little strings attached.
However, these growing interactions have deep roots.
As this paper illustrates, they also have a multidimen-
sional character, encompassing trade, infrastructure
connectivity and multilateralism. Together, these ties are
gradually re-enmeshing Central Asia with parts of Asia
from which it had been isolated for most of its modern
history, and this is itself a noteworthy development. But
what is the broader picture that the sustainment of this
trend could compose in the long run? Even though their
true magnitude will be discernible only “once the dust
has settled to the ground”, the transformations these
tendencies portend – which are taking place against the
backdrop of the rapid and more profound changes the
international system is experiencing – are potentially
far-reaching.
Authors have noted that rivalries between Asian
rising powers were adding an Eastern dimension to
the so-called New Great Game in Central Asia (Contessi,
2013, 237; Cooley, 2014). Calder (2012) argued that
complementarities between the advanced industrial and
the extractive economies of Eurasia are driving the emer-
gence of a new form of continentalism. Lastly, though
more recent opinions have nuanced the realism of such a
proposition (Umland, 2015), Trenin (2015) has argued
that an expanding Sino-Russian axis would bring about
the emergence of a "Greater Asia" that will challenge the
international order. If the trends portrayed in this special
issue stay the course and further deepen in the future,
they could come to offer a corollary to some of those
early assessments. To be sure, the latter are still largely
embryonic and open-ended, and anticipating their future
evolution presents undisputable diﬃculties. Yet, this
does not mean the exercise should not be attempted, as
they pose real challenges for analysts and policymakers
alike.2 Therefore, the exercise pursued herein, if still ten-
tative (and with due caveats), has both scholarly and
policy relevance.
This article begins by canvassing the broad trends that
are giving rise to this pattern, and successively debates
various scenarios in a ﬁrst cut endeavor to anticipate im-
plications. Sections one, two and three survey such
deepening interactions in the areas of trade, infrastruc-
ture connectivity and multilateralism respectively (and by
way of the latter, security and ﬁnance). Section four then
takes a step further and considers the possible ramiﬁca-
tions of these trends. It develops a four-pronged deﬁnition
of international regions and contemplates the possibility
that the long-term sustainment of trans-regional ties around
Central Asia may foreshadow regional consolidation along
continental lines. Acknowledging certain caveats to which
I return in the conclusion – the still nascent nature of these
ties, Central Asia’s continued links to the West, and Asia’s
overall heterogeneity – three different scenarios are put
forward based on different forms of governance that may
emerge in this hypothetical macro-region.
1. Trade
Statistics highlight a pattern of growth in commercial ex-
changes between countries of Central Asia and those of other
subregions of Asia, even amidst diminishing trends between
individual dyads.
Unsurprisingly, the lion’s share goes to ‘usual suspects’
like China, Japan, and South Korea which, in 2013, ranked
among the top ten trading partners for several Central
Asian states. China was the ﬁrst trading partner for Tajiki-
stan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan and the second for
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan; Japan was Kyrgyzstan’s ﬁfth,
Tajikistan’s third and Uzbekistan’s tenth trading partner;
South Korea was Uzbekistan’s fourth, and Turkey was
the ninth partner for Kazakhstan, the ﬁfth for Kyrgyzstan,
the third for Tajikistan, the second for Turkmenistan
and the ﬁfth for Uzbekistan (International Trade Center,
2014).
However, the interesting and less recognized part of the
story is that countries of West, South and – though volumes
remain negligible – even Southeast Asia are taking increas-
ingly prominent positions among Central Asian states’
trading partners.
East Asian countries are clearly the leading Asian part-
ners for Central Asian states (see: Peyrouse and Fumagalli,
this issue, for analyses on China and South Korea respec-
tively). In 2013, China had total trade of $22.5 billion with
Kazakhstan, about $1.5 with Kyrgyzstan, about $2.1 with Ta-
jikistan, $9.3 with Turkmenistan, and $4.5 with Uzbekistan.
In the same year, Japan’s total trade with Kazakhstan
amounted to some $1.7 billion ($ 2.051 in 2012), $258
million with Kyrgyzstan, some $2.5 million with Tajiki-
stan, $61.6 with Turkmenistan and $225.12 with Uzbekistan.
South Korea’s trade with Kazakhstan amounted to some $1.4
billion, $114 million with Kyrgyzstan, $44.5 with Tajiki-
stan, $155.4millionwith Turkmenistan, and $2.2 billionwith
Uzbekistan.
In the South andWest Asian context, the leading trading
partner is Turkey, with close to $3 billion traded with Ka-
zakhstan in 2013, $290millionwith Kyrgyzstan, $655million
with Tajikistan, $2.75 billion with Turkmenistan, and $1.360
with Uzbekistan.
The same year, Iran’s exchanges with Kazakhstan reached
$620.6 million, $22 with Kyrgyzstan, $283 with Tajikistan,
$535 with Turkmenistan and 136 with Uzbekistan, while
India’s trade with Kazakhstan amounted to $677 million,
with Kyrgyzstan to $26.7million, with Tajikistan $48million,
2 At various times, R scholars have observed the need to devote more
efforts to anticipating international change (for instance, see: Gaddis, 1992;
Holsti, 1998; Vincent, 1983; see also: Deutsch, 1966).
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with Turkmenistan 69.3 million and with Uzbekistan
$156.
But out of the various relationships between Asian and
Central Asian countries, the ones with Southeast Asia are
mostly under the radar. Though overall turnover remains
modest, and largely limited to selected countries, these ties
– encompassing tourism, investment and energy – begun
to grow in the 2013–2014 biennium. In 2013, Indonesia’s
tradewith Kazakhstan amounted to $170,452million, $1.946
million with Kyrgyzstan, to $5 million with Tajikistan, $5.1
million with Turkmenistan and $32 with Uzbekistan. The
same year, Malaysia tradedwith Kazakhstan for $122million,
$11.483 with Kyrgyzstan, $5.5 million with Tajikistan, $36.6
with Turkmenistan and $87 with Uzbekistan; Thailand’s
traded $163 million with Kazakhstan, $6 with Kyrgyzstan,
$3 million with Tajikistan, and $9.2 with Turkmenistan;
lastly, Vietnam’s tradewith Kazakhstan reached $234million,
$3.133 with Kyrgyzstan, $9.2 with Turkmenistan and $139
with Thailand.
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What all of this suggests is that Asian countries have an
increasingly important place in the balance of trade and
overall economicwell-beingof Central Asian states. The chart
above captures the weight of the ﬁve Central Asian coun-
tries’ trade with Asia relative to trade with other regions.
On aggregate, between 2009 and 2013, Asian countries ab-
sorbed about one third of Central Asian trade,with a growth
from 29.2 percent in 2009 to 36.8 in 2013. In the face of it,
countries ofWestern Europe andNorth America havemain-
tained a relatively stable position, peaking at 41.8 percent
in 2010 to gradually dwindle down to 36.5 percent in 2013.
This is not to say that Asia has eclipsed theWest, and indeed
if we sum Eastern Europe to the latter, its portion remains
much larger, butAsiahasnonetheless takenagreaterposition.
A breakdown by country (see Fig. 1 below) reveals amore
varied picture, with only a moderate share of Kazakh-
stan’s trade involving Asia, and ﬁgures exceeding 50 per cent
for Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan;
Turkmenistan coming close to 70 per cent in the second half
of the sampled period. Kazakhstan’s situation is not sur-
prising as the country beneﬁts from greater integration with
the global economy and exports large amounts of hydro-
carbons to theWest, fromwhich it imports consumer goods
in return. For its part, Kyrgyzstan has traditionally been the
point of entry for Chinese bazaar goods and shows consid-
erable volumes of trade with Asia. However, this country
has actually experienced a moderate growth in exchanges
with Eastern Europe in the same period, a group that in UN
nomenclature includes Russia, Kyrgyzstan traditional patron.
Tajikistan displays a comparable pattern.
2. Infrastructures
The numerous initiatives to connect Asia through trans-
port and energy corridors that have sprung over the years
are another important development. Some date back several
decades, as in the case of the Asian Land Transport Infra-
structure Development (ALTID), launched under the United
Nations Economic and Social Commission for the Asia-
Paciﬁc (UNESCAP) in 1992.3 Other projects are much more
recent and are being spearheaded by a handful of Asian
powers.
For all its ostensible limitations (Cooley, 2015), the most
notable of these is China’s One Belt, One Road (OBOR), un-
veiled by President Xi Jinping in September 2013, and which
some already dub Beijing’s Marshall Plan for Asia. Also
known as the Silk Road Economic Belt initiative, it com-
prises a land-based corridor stretching from Xi’an (i.e. the
Chang’an of the ancient silk road) to Lanzhou (Gansu) to
Urumqi (Xinjiang) and Khorgos (Xinjiang) through Central
Asia to Iraq, Syria, Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Czech Repub-
lic and Germany, and a maritime route from Guangzhou
(Guangdong province) all the way to Venice through the
Suez Canal.4 The Chinese government estimates the initia-
tives can generate a total economic turnover of $21.1 trillion
(Tiezzi, 2014a, 2014b; Want China Times, 2014). To accel-
erate investments into infrastructure modernization, the
Chinese government has created a $40 billion Silk Road fund
and adopted a domestic policy framework to encourage
Chinese banks to lend money to other countries investing
in infrastructure along the planned route (Chu, 2013; RT,
2014a). This adds to $25 billion earmarked for the Mari-
time Silk Road and investments in the amount of $50 billion
Beijing already pledged to Central Asia in 2013. The Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), oﬃcially launched at
the end of June 2015, will provide additional ﬁnancial muscle
for these initiatives. The AIIB is due to start lending in 2016,
with a target of $15 bn a year (Bermingham 2015). Need-
less to say, all this raises critical questions about the viability
(in China) and transparency (in beneﬁciary countries) of such
a large scale investment. In the energy ﬁeld, twomajor proj-
ects already link Central Asia with China. The ﬁrst is the
2,228 km Kazakhstan–China oil pipeline that was com-
pleted between 2001 and 2009, with a current capacity of
20 million tons of oil per year. The second is the China–
Central Asia Pipeline, which pumps natural gas from
Turkmenistan (lines A, B and C), as well as Kazakhstan and
Uzbekistan (line C). Line D – the fourth section, scheduled
to be ready by 2016/17 – will deliver gas from another ﬁeld
in Turkmenistan. The four lines of the China–Central Asia
3 ALTID combined under a single banner the preexisting Asian Highway
and Trans-Asian Railway projects, themselves originally launched in the
1960s. ALTID intersects with other trans-continental transit initiatives like
TRACECA and especially CAREC. In 2001, UNESCAP and the United Nations
Economic Commission for Europe have partnered in a joint project known
as the Euro–Asia Transport Linkages to build transport corridors between
the two continents.
4 Some of these corridors like the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor
(notwithstanding a volatile security situation) and the Bangladesh–China–
India–Myanmar Economic Corridor, as well as various Western routes
through Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan are already being imple-
mented. See Mu (2014).
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Pipeline are destined to supply more than 40 percent of Bei-
jing’s gas requirements by 2020 – the equivalent of 80 billion
cubic meters per year (Contessi, 2014a).
Another project is South Korea’s Eurasia Initiative
launched in October 2013, on occasion of the Internation-
al Conference on Global Cooperation in the Era of Eurasia
held in Seoul, just shortly after China unveiled its Belt
initiative. Its stated goal is to build “a single continent
connected by logistics and energy networks” with the
prospective goal of setting up a single market from the
Paciﬁc to the Atlantic. The energy component is centered
on electric grids, oil and gas pipelines; while the transit
component hinges on a web of transcontinental road and
rail links, destined, in the latter case, to enable a Silk Road
Express (SRX) train from Busan to Europe (Park, 2013).
Central to this initiative is the Russian Far East as the
geographical connector in a terrestrial network spanning
South Korea, North Korea, Russia and China to Central
Asia and from there reaching further to Europe. This
South Korea–North Korea–Russia triangulation could, in
the hopes of the South Korean leadership, contribute to
the amelioration of inter-Korean relations. The construc-
tion of a 54 km cross-border freight rail line between the
North Korean port of Rajin and the Russian city of Khasan
is under way,5 and a Trans Eurasia Information Network
should be completed by the ﬁrst half of 2016. The integra-
tion of Korean and Russian electricity grids is also being
studied. Prior to this, Seoul partnered with Uzbekistan in
the construction of the Navoyi Transport Hub, the largest
logistical center in Central Asia with annual capacity of
100,000 tons, inaugurated in August 2010 and operated
by Korean Air Cargo (see Fumagalli, this issue).
Like its counterparts, India’s Connect Central Asia policy
aims to rekindle ancient ties, notwithstanding its depen-
dence on the volatile Af-Pak region. Delhi has proposed the
long-term integration of land routes linking it to Central Asia
as spurs of the planned international North–South corri-
dor. Likewise, in the energy ﬁeld, another goal is that of
creating stable energy supply links to India for hydro-
electricity from Tajikistan or hydrocarbons from the Caspian
5 The South Korean government is nudging private investors to pur-
chase a 34 percent stake in the RasonKonTrans Russian–North Korean joint
venture that is developing the corridor.
Data: ITC 2014
Regions are based on UN Regional Groups
(http://www.un.org/depts/DGACM/RegionalGroups.shtml).
N.B. West is short for the Western Europe and Others group; East 
are countries from the Eastern Europe group, which includes 
Russia.
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Sea, with the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India
(TAPI) pipeline as a key plank of this strategy.
Iran has also been working with Central Asian coun-
tries towards the restoration of ancient transport ties in a
similar Silk Road logic, though its policy is more limited in
breadth and reach. The Kazakhstan–Turkmenistan–Iran
north–south railway opened in December 2014, gives the
two Central Asian countries a direct link to the open seas
(Daly, 2014; Iran Daily, 2014). But, Iran is also poised to take
an important place in China’s Silk Road belts itself, bothmar-
itime and land based, with potential to become an
interchange between overland andmaritime routes. The pos-
sible lifting of sanctions, following the ratiﬁcation of the 2015
nuclear agreement, could unlock even greater potential for
Tehran.
Due to its insular nature, Japan has not played a major
role in the development of pan-Asian connectivity. Tokyo has
been mainly a donor for ongoing multilateral initiatives and
feasibility studies, consistent with its foreign policy of as-
sistance (see Dadabayev, this issue). However, in May 2015,
Prime Minister Abe used the ﬂoor of the 21st International
Conference on the Future of Asia to announce the creation
of a ﬁve-year plan for infrastructure investments in Asia
funded to the tune of $110 bln (Kihara & Sieg, 2015). During
his October 2015 tour of Central Asia, he announced $25 bln
in infrastructure and other projects (Japan Times, 2015).
3. Multilateralism
A further sign of Central Asia’s eastward tilt is its growing
involvement in a variety of pan-Asian multilateral frame-
works that have emerged over the years.6 These range from
the Conference on Interaction and Conﬁdence BuildingMea-
sures in Asia (CICA), to the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO) in the area of security, and, most re-
cently, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and,
to an extent, the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) in the eco-
nomic sphere. Three main factors combine to give these
institutions a continental breadth.
First are the strategies of their respective prime movers
(China and Russia above all). Having taken a wider Asian
outlook in their foreign policy orientations – China with its
MarchWest policy and Russiawith its Look East policy – both
powers are bound to imbue, in oneway or another, theirmul-
tilateral creationswith that rationale. Second, themembership
of these groupings – whether current or projected – com-
prises countries from different parts of Asia. CICA and AIIB
have a clearly pancontinental roster of members (the latter
also including non-regional members), while the SCO is set
to expand its membership presently limited to Central Asian
countries.7 Through its push for free trade agreements (FTAs)
with countries in various parts of Asia, the EEU has taken a
similar route. A third and last factor is represented by ‘in-
stitutional tie-ups’, a term here used to describe the variety
of cooperation agreements or memoranda of understand-
ing (MoU) reached between Secretariats of different
multilateral organizations. While these have often little sub-
stance, they do carry a political signiﬁcance that is worth
taking note of.
Founded in 1992, CICA, a little known organization pro-
moting dialogue, conﬁdence building, and counter-terrorism,
only held its ﬁrst Summit in 2002. With 26 member states
spanning the Asian continent, CICA is the most compre-
hensive multilateral body on Asian security despite
signiﬁcant gaps.8 It is also at the center of a web of insti-
tutional tie-ups with various other regional organizations,
including MoU’s with ASEAN and the SCO, concluded in
2014. As its name and membership lineup indicate, CICA
had a clear pan-continental aspiration from the begin-
ning. Under China’s two-year chairmanship, CICAmay in the
future turn into the cornerstone for a new security gover-
nance framework for the whole of Asia. At the 2014 Summit,
Beijing laid out plans to strengthen its institutional archi-
tecture, including the functions of the permanent secretariat;
intensify high-level meetings; and establish a mechanism
for defense consultations (CICA, 2014).
Having developed since its establishment into what is
probably themost consequential regional grouping in Central
Asia, the SCO already connects the latter region to East and
North Asia byway of China and Russia. The 2015 Ufa Summit
boosted the organization’s trans-regional breadth with the
addition of India and Pakistan, previously observer states,
as full members. But the SCO’s Observer and Dialogue Part-
ners further underscore its continental breadth: the former
include Iran and Mongolia, and the latter Sri Lanka and
Turkey. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cambodia and Nepal were also
given dialogue partner status at the Ufa summit. The SCO
has likewise been pursuing institutional tie-ups with various
Asia-Paciﬁcmultilaterals. Between 2005 and 2014, it reached
MoUs with the Association of South East Asian Nations
(ASEAN) (2005), the Economic Cooperation Organization
(ECO) (2007), the United Nations Economic and Social Com-
mission for the Asia-Paciﬁc (UNESCAP) (2008), and
CICA itself (2014). Though concrete results remain to be seen,
these ties exemplify, at least symbolically, a distinct polit-
ical orientation. Nonetheless, cooperationwith UNESCAP has
supported the conclusion of the SCO Intergovernmental Agree-
ment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Member States
on the Facilitation of International Road Transport that was
signed in Dushanbe in September 2014, and will also assist
in its implementation.
Launched in 2015, with a clearly continental member-
ship roster andmandate, the Asian Infrastructure Investment
Bank is poised to become a catalyst of continental integra-
tion. With initial capital of $100 billion, the AIIB will help
ﬁll a shortfall in infrastructure investment in Asia that the
Asian Development Bank estimated to stand at $8 trillion
6 These obviously do not include the variety of Post-Soviet groupings
that have also emerged since the end of the Cold War, which are outside
the scope of this article.
7 The SCO has engaged non-local countries through observer and dia-
logue partner arrangements since 2004. Also positing the SCO as a trans-
regional organization is Jackson (2014).
8 The current membership includes the ﬁve Central Asian countries;
Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Palestine, Jordan, Qatar, and the United Arab Emir-
ates in theMiddle East; Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan,
and Turkey in West and South Asia; Cambodia, China, Mongolia, South
Korea, Thailand, and Vietnam in East and Southeast Asia. Russia and Egypt
are also members, while Japan, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Sri
Lanka, Ukraine, and the US have observer status.
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for the period 2010–2020 (The Straits Times, 2015). All
Central Asian countries but Turkmenistan are among its
founding members as well as more than 30 other Asian
countries and twenty non-Asian ones.
Finally, the EEU may also end up playing a role in pro-
moting closer trans-regional ties between Central Asia and
Asia, though from a revisited Russia-centric logic, and this
notwithstanding the economic crises aﬄicting its key
members. Althoughmembership is currently limited to only
ﬁve former soviet countries (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakh-
stan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia), the EEU is increasingly leaning
toward Asia in two main ways. On one hand, by negotiat-
ing Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with various Asian
countries. Negotiations with Vietnamwere completed in De-
cember 2014 and if the agreement enters into force by the
end of 2015 (Small, 2014), as a Russian high-ranking oﬃ-
cial contended, this could then provide a blueprint for similar
agreementswith other ASEAN countries, and eventually even
the future ASEAN Economic Community (Kamalakaran,
2015; Korablinov, 2015; Standartnews, 2014). A similar doc-
ument was reportedly reached with Egypt (Ghazanchyan,
2015), and discussions with India began during the 2013
Saint Petersburg Economic Forum (Debidatta, 2014;
ITAR-TASS, 2014). Iran, Israel, Thailand and Turkey have also
expressed their interest in a FTAwith the EEU (Asbarez.com,
2015; ITAR-TASS, 2015b; Panﬁlova, 2014; RT, 2014b; Tehran
Times, 2015; Times of Central Asia, 2015). Another kind of
linkage is the prospective integration between the EEU and
the Silk Road Economic Belt, which Russia and China agreed
in May 2015 (ITAR-TASS 2015a).
4. Gauging the impact of a more Asian Eurasia
Authors have underscored the profoundly transforma-
tive effect that the consolidation of international regions
could have on the conﬁguration of world politics (Acharya,
2007; Hurrell, 2007). The redrawing of regional boundar-
ies could be equally signiﬁcant. Deeper ties between different
parts of Asia imply not only consolidation, but also a re-
deﬁnition of these boundaries, and, conceivably, the
translation of regionalism to a larger, continental, scale.
Therefore, addressing the question of what could be some
of the repercussions of denser trans-Asian ties on the in-
ternational system, albeit still in a hypothetical form requires
taking a broader perspective and partially shifting our focus
from the immediate Central Asian neighborhood. This, in
turn, requires thinking critically about regionalism. Atten-
tion must be devoted to the deep features that undergird
regions, in order to subsequently understand how emerg-
ing trajectories could modify those very same features.
Deﬁnitions of international regions have traditionally em-
phasized a mix of physical proximity and shared cultural,
political, and economic ties. More recent conceptualiza-
tions have laid emphasis on their socially constructed nature
as well (Acharya, 2007, 634; Hurrell, 2007; Katzenstein,
2005). Implicit in the evolution of such deﬁnitions is a
growing understanding that, together with their geograph-
ical and behavioral features, it is the substantive content of
regional interactions and their associated practices thatmake
these constellations politically salient (Ayoob, 1999; Lemke,
2002; Nye, 1968; Paul, 2012).
Building on this rich debate, a deﬁnition highlighting
shared rules of the game, whether formal or informal, whose
validity is recognized by states within a bounded geograph-
ical space, has the merit of subsuming various aspects of
these existing deﬁnitions, while also contributing to an un-
derstanding that is more sensitive to power.9 From this
perspective, regions can be distinguished on the basis of four
main pillars: an ideological status quo (Lemke, 2002; see
also Katzenstein, 2005); a degree of institutionalization
(Katzenstein, 2005);10 norms of intervention by outside
actors (Hurrell, 2007, 132), namely the conditions and the
manners in which outside states are permitted to wield in-
ﬂuence; lastly, the practices for accessing territory –
especially understood in terms of the markets and the
natural resources contained within it, the allocation of con-
tracts for extracting them, and the ways of trading them
(Lemke, 2002, 55–6).
Another merit of this deﬁnition is to help clarify how
power can travel between regional and global levels. Because
regions can be conceived of as an ‘intermediate [and, one
may add, relatively autonomous] form of community’
between the nation – state and international society
(Whiting, 1993, 20), the connotation of such rules can bear
on the nature of the international order and of the global
distribution of power. Hence, such a deﬁnition can also help
us gauging the implications that deeper trans-regional ties
could have on the nature of regionalism in Asia. However,
the speciﬁc connotation (and ensuing global impact) of the
rules of the game of continental regionalism in Asia would
be determined by the type of governance such space came
to adhere to. In turn, this hinges on how the discrete agen-
cies of different categories of actors combine with one
another, and on the degree of collaboration the more pow-
erful players will be able to elicit from smaller Asian and
Central Asian states. The latter, in fact, hold the keys to the
type of governance that could ultimately prevail.11 Unfold-
ing evidence is currently consistent with three distinct
scenarios, each embodying a different form of gover-
nance: hegemony, concert, or a more diffuse balance of
power. Underwriting these scenarios is an implicit dialec-
tic between two sets of parallel logics: on one hand,
integration on a continental scale through growing inter-
action and consolidation and fragmentation at the system
level, due to the geographically based differentiation of in-
terstate practices, consistent with the hegemonic and concert
scenarios; on the other hand, fragmentation (at least polit-
ical) on a continental scale and integration at the system
9 This resonates with Alagappa’s (2003: 34) emphasis on “rule gov-
erned interaction”.
10 To the extent that multilateralism represents the primary vehicle for
the allocation of values in the international system (Contessi, 2014b), the
ideological aspect goes hand in hand with the institutions that embed it.
11 Actors in different categories can be expected to hold different out-
looks on the future evolution of the Asian space. For the unipole, regions
are an important connector permitting the local articulation of inﬂuence
through the integration into globalization and extends its security guar-
antees (Hurrell, 2007; Katzenstein, 2005). For regional rising powers and
would-be regional (or global) hegemons, regions represent a spring-
board for organizing and propelling their aﬃrmation on the world stage.
For smaller Asian states, the region represents a more proximate, acces-
sible and familiar international level.
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level, referring to the assimilation of the continent’s dis-
parate regional realities into global logics and the
minimization of continental coherence, consistent with the
balance of power scenario.
Which scenario will occur could depend on a plethora
of intervening variables.12 Having emerged, in its 25 years
of independent existence, as a strategic crossroad for con-
nectivity projects, and as a political laboratory for original
governance solutions, Central Asia is uniquely positioned
to play a pivotal role in this regard.
4.1. Hegemony
Thanks to unmatched capabilities and a geographic lo-
cation as the ideal seam between Asia’s disparate cores,
Beijing can play a catalyzing role in joining up these various
parts, and has the ambition to do so. One possibility, there-
fore, is a Sino-centric hegemonic scenario. China already is
the largest trading partner for most countries of Asia and
is positioned to become the main public goods provider for
the emerging continental region, a role that can give it sway
over the connotation of rules of the game.
In ideological terms, starting from Central Asia, China has
been promoting a New Security Concept for over a decade.
Premised on the so-called Five Principles of Peaceful Co-
existence, it stresses Westphalian statehood as well as
mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sov-
ereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference
in each other’s internal affairs, equality and cooperation for
mutual beneﬁt. Though similar principles are generally quite
widely upheld throughout Asia independent of China’s pref-
erence, Xi’s statement at the 2014 CICA Summit indicates
Beijingwill be pushing to extend them on a continental scale.
As a result, it is therefore possible that the former prin-
ciples could emerge as the ideological status quo for an Asian
continental region. In turn, this could cement a body of lo-
calized values diluting perhaps the cultural homogeneity
of the liberal international order, which some consider a key
requirement for effective global governance (Hurrell, 2007,
128).
In institutional terms, Beijing has become, over the years,
the foremost institutional entrepreneur in Asia both in the
economic sphere, presiding over the 2015 launch of the AIIB,
and in security, with its role in founding the SCO in 2001,
which it still leads with Russia. These venues are key plat-
forms for shaping regional governance. Xi’s proposal for
revamping CICA goes in a simlar direction, though its results
remain uncertain. If Chinese ambitions are successful, CICA
could eventually become an overarching institutional frame-
work with a continental breadth. As developments within
the SCO suggest (see Ambrosio, 2008; Al-Qahtani, 2006;
Human Rights in China, 2011), the gradual process of
legalization (Abbott, Keohane, Moravcsik, Slaughter, & Snidal,
2000) within the various continental institutions could re-
inforce such a non-western ideological status quo by
translating its values into hard and, more often, soft law.
If themembership enlargement goes forward, the SCO could
further contribute to this outcome by increasing the number
of Asian states abiding by principles of interaction that China
played a primary role in shaping. The AIIB will likely
further contribute to the codiﬁcation of rules and prac-
tices in the ﬁnancial sector that can rival the ones embodied
in both the IFIs and the Japan-led Asian Development
Bank.
Leveraging its economic prowess, China is becoming a
key beneﬁciary of rules of territorial access, tying to itself
many regional countries, for which natural resources rep-
resent the main economic activity. Chinese companies have
already acquired the rights to much of the region’s re-
sources, and oil and gas pipelines already ﬂow to China from
Kazakhstan, Myanmar, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. More-
over, in 2014, Beijing also agreed to build a pipeline from
Russia’s ﬁelds in Eastern Siberia and also is a major im-
porter of other minerals and rawmaterials from the region.
As a component of China’s broader March West strategy to
boost its presence in and engagement of Central Asia, South
Asia and the Middle East, OBOR can further contribute to
reorienting rules of access towards Beijing. Building on over
20 years of engagement of Central Asia, OBOR is the most
articulated, well ﬁnanced, and promising of the various con-
nectivity projects.13
Lastly, China is spearheading the search for a new se-
curity architecture for the whole of Asia that would
transform norms of intervention, in what Acharya (2007,
644) argued could represent an Asian version of the Monroe
Doctrine. Its Asian Security Conceptwas proposed as a “code
of conduct” in the political and security spheres with the
unconcealed intent of locking the US out of Asia. In the
words of President Xi Jinping, this would transcend the “Cold
War thinking” of what he labeled as efforts to “beef up a
military alliance targeting a third party [i.e. China]” (Xi
Jinping, 2014). Beijing plans to use its two-year CICA chair-
manship to advance these purposes (Gov.cn, 2014). The
gradual consolidation of a continental region could foster
a more cloistered regional space, if not an actual “zone of
autarky” (Calder, 2012, 284), relatively insulated from off-
shore balancing, as the effect of the “stopping power of
water” (Mearsheimer, 2001, 114) is reversed.
In sum, in a Sino-centric hegemonic scenario, rules of
the game could enshrine a self-referential ordering, with
different subregions hierarchically organized internally and
closed off to outsiders externally. Or at least, one in which
Beijing has primacy over the terms under which these out-
siders may engage and how subregions interact. However,
12 Changes in the foreign policy priorities of one or more of the key
players; domestic instability and/or regime change in one or more of the
regional players; alteration in the distribution of power in Asia; the coun-
tervailing efforts of external powers and a major shift in technology are
some factors that could alter, disrupt or weaken the trajectory of inter-
national change in one direction or another.
13 Unlike other plans, it is integrated within a national economic devel-
opment strategy and a variety of collateral domestic and foreign policy
tools, while also being poised to beneﬁt regional economies locally. More-
over, it appears Chinese leaders also see the Silk Road as a space for capital
and currency integration based on the internationalization of the Renmimbi
(Tiezzi, 2014a).
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Beijing has been coy about assuming wide ranging inter-
national responsibilities. Moreover, mistrust is widespread
given China’s sheer size and the potency of China-threat nar-
ratives that could undermine Beijing’s prospects, including
in Central Asia, as Peyrouse argues in this issue. Other el-
igible powers in Asia may also put a brake on Beijing’s
ambitions.
4.2. Multipolarity
A second scenario is that of a polycentric Asia pro-
pelled by multiple engines: from the deepening Sino-
Russian partnership, to the multiple other pivotal states in
various sub-regions: ﬁrst and foremost, India (and Paki-
stan) – bound to join the SCO as full members – but also
Iran, Japan, South Korea and Turkey. Thanks to the alli-
ances that the three latter countries have with them,
Western powers are equally involved in this process. All
these states can further facilitate trans-regional connec-
tions, while smaller states are likewise nurturing closer ties
not only with these pivotal players, but also directly with
their peers. Depending on how thesemultiple agencies stack
up, the resulting multipolarity could take one of two pos-
sible conﬁgurations.
First, Asia’s various pivotal states rank considerably on
various measures of national power, and their élites can be
said to share a similar worldview and role identities favor-
ing strong foreign policy independence. As a result, if they
were able to reach a grand bargain inwhich the payoff from
mutual accommodation was bigger than what they could
obtain through cooperation with outside powers, one pos-
sible conﬁguration could then be some variant of a concert
system. As born out of the European experience, a concert
implies a pact among key powers, underwritten by a logic
of collusion in thenameof bothmutual assistanceandmutual
control. While a 21st Century, Asian concert would pre-
sumably differ somewhat from that historical ideal type; the
region’s pivotal states have been developing modes of in-
teraction that presently seem to observe similar
conventions.14 As observers put it, the Sino-Russian rela-
tionship is premised on various forms of accommodation
and compensation (Gabuev, 2015; Yan, 2014). Russia–
South Korea, Russia–Iran, Russia–India and China–Iran are
other dyads that have developed a grammar for construc-
tive engagement with one another. The Russia–India–
China trilateral is a further arrangement that has allowed
its members to reach agreement on key principles of rela-
tions (Trenin, 2015), and this notwithstanding India’s
substantial ambivalence, or the longstanding Sino-Indianhis-
torical rivalry. It is possible that the logic underpinning these
formats may eventually ﬁnd a broader application. In this
case, collusion among members of the pact and obser-
vance of the respective spheres of interest would inspire
regional rules of the game.
Rules of territorial access and outside intervention would
both likely hinge on the ﬁnal say of a handful of powers
within their respective spheres of inﬂuence likely orga-
nized along existing sub-regions. In the case of Central Asia,
this would remain Russia for the foreseeable future, not-
withstanding China’s inroads (Peyrouse, this issue). For
example, the closing of American military bases in Uzbeki-
stan (2005) and in Kyrgyzstan (2014), which were widely
attributed to Russian diplomatic efforts, is indicative of
emerging norms of intervention in the sub-region. China’s
efforts in the South China Sea are not very different.
As seen above, virtually all of Asia’s pivotal states are
also pursuing Silk Road policies aimed at building connec-
tivity and accessing territory and markets in the larger
region. Tellingly, while American and European energy and
mining companies still beneﬁt from concessions obtained
in the early 1990s, Asian states are increasingly obtaining
access to the continent’s natural resources – primarily
Central Asian ones. Together with denser infrastructure con-
nectivity, this could give shape to a self-suﬃcient continental
space capable of sustaining itself through intramural trade
and supply chains. It thus seems plausible that other
members of the pact would receive a favorable treatment
relative to outsiders in their attempt to access other sub-
regions, and, from a politico-military perspective, could be
involved in interventions through joint operations. Con-
currently, the ability of outsiders to access that same territory
may result diminished, though some of these Asian cus-
tomers, like Japan, South Korea, and to some extent, India,
are also Western allies or partners. It thus seems plausible
that other members of the pact would receive a favorable
treatment relative to outsiders in their attempt to access
other sub-regions, and could participate in intervention
through joint operations.
The institutional shape of the continent would proba-
bly still see multiple institutional structures coexisting side
by side, typically under the leadership of one key power,
like for example, the AIIB and possibly CICA, or acting as
compensation chambers where their respective interests can
be reconciled like the SCO- notably thanks to its two-
headed leadership. If the membership enlargement decided
at the 2015 Ufa Summit goes forward, the SCO could then
become one of the chief venues for an Asian concert.
Conversely, the ideological status quo in an Asian concert
would plausibly uphold principles inspired by the Bandung
legacy which already form common ground among the
various Asian powers, as well as other consensual ele-
ments favored by these keymembers within their respective
spheres. These values would provide the fundamental glue
holding together the great power bargain. Currently, the
qualitative nature of multilateralism that is emerging from
the institutional overlap in the wider Asia – whether in the
form of tie-ups, mutual observer relationships, or direct
membership – seems to increasingly embody similar core
values. For instance, as President of Vietnam Truong Tan Sang
noted: ‘ASEAN and SCO share similar approaches and also
emphasize the importance of maintaining peace, stability
and general welfare of the region’. Underwritten by the
‘Shanghai Spirit’ and its constituent Five Principles of Peace-
ful Coexistence, the SCO, is, like ASEAN and its underlying
‘ASEAN Way’, a distant descendant of Bandung and the
14 Key features of a concert system include: great power tutelage on the
international system; the inviolability of the territorial status quo without
great power consent; the protection and defense of key members of the
state system; and great power refrain from challenging one another in their
vital interests or in their prestige and honor (Elrod, 1976, 160; Väyrynen,
2003, 29).
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nonaligned tradition, while other institutions share, in one
way or another, a similar inclination. Nonetheless, as far as
ASEAN is concerned, while expressing a vision for an Asian
regional order, it also seeks conciliation with the Western-
led international order.
In sum, a concert would be consistent with the logic of
continental consolidation, although one hinging on an oli-
garchic rather than hegemonic governance revolving around
the ordering role of the main regional powers, andmore or
lesshierarchical relationsbetween the formerand the smaller
states in the respective subregions,whichwould tendentially
be organized as spheres of inﬂuence. Though they may be
consulted sporadically, smaller states in the subregionswould
likely have reduced opportunities to interact autono-
mouslywithother subregions.Andpowersyet, theegalitarian
principles of the Bandung ethos could temper this. Exter-
nally, a concert-based Asia would be relatively closed off to
outside players, as members of the pact seek to perpetuate
their prerogatives. Renewed multivectoral diplomacy in
Central Asia suggests attempts to prevent such scenario.
A second variant of multipolarity is the one built on a
balance of power system where the major players adhere
to the more competitive logic of a dynamic confrontation
and search for preponderance (Elrod, 1976, 160). Themajor
poles in such a system typically struggle with one another
to maintain equilibrium by preventing or redressing im-
balances in the distribution of power between them (Lobell,
2014), polarity being a function of the way technology, re-
source endowments, economic andmilitary capabilities are
distributed, such logic is associated with a pluralistic gov-
ernancewhere political and economic forces are profoundly
intertwined, due to the intensiﬁcation of ties across Asia of
the kind that this issue has surveyed. However it’s been ob-
jected that some Asian states are too far apart to develop
regional rivalries (Lemke, 2002), Washington’s Pivot to Asia
andNewSilk Road Initiative, Beijing’sMarchWestpolicy,Mos-
cow’s New Eastern Policy, as well as Delhi’s, Seoul’s, and
Tokyo’s overhauled Asia and Central Asia policies may all
conspire to bringing about this type of outcome. The smaller
states’ strategies to resist domination by stronger regional
powers would be instrumental to such an outcome.
From an institutional point of view, this could entail the
aﬃrmation of a multilayered system of overlapping great
power-led institutions with the cohabitation of Eastern and
Western templates. Such institutionswould presumably have
limited effectiveness in terms of outputs, and serve mainly
as power multipliers. Meanwhile, a certain bifurcation can
be highlighted within the wider Asian institutional overlap,
betweenmore ‘continental’ projects, and both ‘trans-Paciﬁc’
and ‘Euro-Atlantic’ initiatives like the Asia-Paciﬁc Econom-
ic Cooperation (APEC), or the East Asia Summit, and the OSCE
respectively. This would probably mirror a degree of nor-
mative competition from an ideological point of view, with
Bandung principles defying efforts to uphold the liberal in-
ternational order through alternate institutional frameworks.
Territorial access in such a scenario would likely corre-
late with alignment patterns, though contractual obligations
may occasionally be reviewed as the former are reconsid-
ered, and pivotal states make efforts to undermine one
another. The various Silk Road policies that disparate players
are spearheading can contribute to maintaining the region
accessible to other states as well. Moreover, a new round
of oﬃcial visits to Central Asia by Heads of State and Gov-
ernment of virtually all Asian powers between 2013 and
2015 (Xi, Park, Modi, Putin, Abe), capped by US Secretary
of State John Kerry’s, suggest the prolongation of a degree
of geopolitical pluralism.
Lastly, the continued demand for offshore balancing could
preserve a certain openness as far as norms of interven-
tion are concerned, with regional states seeking outside allies
to balance local rivals. Countries like Japan or South Korea
are linked to the US through a system of formal alliances,
but it is uncertain whether this could eventually elicit an
opposite formal alliance, though a China–Russia strategic
partnership and even a China-Russia-Iran triangle have been
developing in response. In absence of a formal countervail-
ing coalition, we could see limited hard balancing perhaps
with US allies favoring catching the buck, as well as a revival
of surrogate balancing through institutions or norms
(Contessi, 2009; He, 2012; Paul, 2005). In this regard, India’s
attempt to combine ties in Asia with a strategic partner-
ship with the US is emblematic.
In sum, a balance of power scenario would prevent the
consolidation of a coherent continental region, sustaining
instead a degree of openness for outside powers and a
greater assimilation into the wider international order. As
a result, we may see the different sub-regions of Asia to be
more dispersed politically, propelling higher degrees of in-
teraction than in alternative conﬁgurations and acting as
entry points from which the kind of ties described herein
could exert multiple centrifugal pulls sustaining an Asian
New Great Game.
5. Conclusion
This special issue has grappled with developments that
are contributing to bringing together parts of Asia that are
fundamentally distinct, with Central Asia positioned to play
an unprecedented pivotal role. The individual papers by
Sébastien Peyrouse, Timur Dadabaev and Matteo Fumagalli
zoomed in on the nature of Central Asia’s ties with China,
Japan and South Korea respectively examining these evolv-
ing relations in the economic and political realms. Taking
stock, this article speculated on what may be some of the
larger ramiﬁcations these developments could have, sug-
gesting three distinct scenarios: a hegemonic governance
centered around China, and two alternative multipolar con-
ﬁgurations distinguished by the underlying principle of
interaction, whether collusion or competition.
Of these, the former two adhere to a logic character-
ized by continental consolidation. Regardless of intensity
and degree, this could result in a more fragmented of the
international system as continental fault lines becomemore
pronounced. The latter, on the other hand, depicts a tra-
jectory driven by the opposite logic of assimilation of the
continent into the global order and a more fragmented con-
tinental region. As a result the outcome of this dialectic,
therefore, could have far reaching implications for the in-
ternational system.
However, already wildly contested today, the type of gov-
ernance that may eventually emerge on a more closely knit
Asian continent is unlikely to be a perfect embodiment of one
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model or another, in light of the obvious continuities between
the three forms. Even if a concert does prevail, thismay even-
tually turn into a balance of power if the grand bargain
underwriting collusion is altered; likewise, a balance of power
may solidify into collusion if a viable equilibrium is achieved
that can lead to the development of cooperative norms. Con-
versely, should a preponderant power like China be able to
stem the formation of balancing coalitions, this imbalance
may eventually consolidate into hegemony. Likewise, a
concert systemmay eventually decay as other playersweaken
vis-à-vis China, and the latter becomes the ultimate guar-
antor of the rules initially embodied in the concert. Vice-
versa, it could give way to a more competitive environment
in the absence of a single preponderant actor.
In closing, a few cautionary points are in order if wewant
to avoid over-interpreting the reach of these transforma-
tions. First, the nature of these ties remains very much at
the level of incipient tendencies, whose direction, strength
and pace could change in future years. Even though infra-
structures are sprawling, Asia’s sub-regional components
remain distant. From a trade perspective, even though the
overall portion of Central Asia–Asia trade has been growing
steadily, the volumes of exchanges remain relatively small
even with some of the larger countries like Japan or India
– though recent trips by state leaders may change this.
Second, as far as Central Asia is concerned, these trends
have not developed at the expense of the region’s west-
ward strategic links,15 even though, as far as trade is
concerned, this has been the case for individual Central
Asian countries. As such, this might just be a stage in an
ongoing process whereby the Eastern and Western orien-
tations of the Central Asian region eventually merge to give
rise to a transcontinental Eurasia. Likewise, the balance
between the two orientations may further tilt in one di-
rection or another. Either way, Central Asian countries have
an unprecedented pivotal role to play as the catalysts of
international change.
Third, Asia is a heterogeneous geo-cultural, geo-economic
and geopolitical space with nations separated by distances
or natural obstacles of various sorts; using very different lan-
guages (some with entirely different roots); and practicing
different religions. Each nation also has different priorities
and facesunique security situations thatoftenprecludeagree-
ment on regional issues (Wuthnow, 2014). Moreover, as
Peyrouse (this issue) has shownwith regard to China, deep
mistrust still dampens higher levels of cooperation.16
For the foreseeable future, the wider Asian region will
probably resemble a ﬂuid geopolitical space where all three
logics intersect as a result of the agency of multiple state
entrepreneurs, system-level factors (including Western
efforts to keep the space open to outside intervention and
resource extraction and linked to the liberal international
order – mainly epitomized in the US’s pivot to Asia), the
forces of globalization and technological change. More-
over, the alignment choices of smaller states could be
decisive. In this sense, the coming years are likely to see a
dialectic between efforts to erect a “zone of autarky”,
whether under a hegemonic or concert scenario, and those
aimed at maintaining a balance of power, primarily with
Western assistance, that could ensure some degree of plu-
ralism these outside players prefer.
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